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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF. UTAH
SALT BOWL COMPANY A
UTAH CORPORATION
Plaintiff and Respondent
—vs—

Case
No. 13847

STATE OF UTAH
Defendant and Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a Civil action to recover damages for
alleged wrongful termination of a lease agreement
between the parties above named. Appellant served a
notice of violation on the Respondent to which the
Respondent responded by cancelling auto races
scheduled at the Utah State Fairgrounds. The notice of
violation was served by Appellant in response to a
"noise ordinance" passed by Salt Lake City and a
failure on the part of Respondent to obtain a variance
from Salt Lake City to conduct its races.
1
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The case was tried in two parts without a jury. The
first part on the question of liability and the second part
on the question of damages.
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
The trial court found that Respondent was entitled
to damages caused by the wrongful termination by
Appellant of a Lease agreement between the parties.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellant seeks a reversal of the courts judgment
or remand of the case with an instruction that the
notice of violation was legally justifiable and that
respondent is not entitled to damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Division of Expositions of the State of
Utah, and Respondent, Salt Bowl Company, entered
into a five year lease agreement on October 11, 1967.
(Ex P-l, R-32, Tr 20). The lease was for a period from
May 1, 1967 to May 1, 1973 and granted Respondent
the right to use certain portions of the Utah State
Fairgrounds to conduct auto racing. The lease
agreement contained an exclusive option to renew the
lease agreement for an additional term of five years. (R32, Ex P-l paragraph 18).
Two methods are provided in the lease agreement
for termination. Paragraph 13 provides for automatic
termination if a Court having jurisdiction determines
that Lessee's activities are unlawful Paragraphs 9 and
16 provide a second method of termination. Paragraph
9 requires the lessee to "conduct activities on the above
2
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described premises in a lawful manner
shall
comply with all. . . .Local laws in connection with its
operations
" Paragraph 16 provides that if
Lessor has reason to believe Lessee is in violation of
any "Local Law" the Lessor shall send Lessee a notice
of violation and Lessee is required to correct the
violation within 5 days or the lease will be terminated.
The subject case involves the above described
lease and a request for renewal of the lease by
Respondent filed May 1, 1973 (Ex P-3) and a notice of
violation served on Respondent May 12, 1973 pursuant
to paragraph 9 of the lease. (Ex P-4) The notice of
violation was served for violation of the Salt Lake City
"Noise Ordinance" (32-9-3 subparagraph P, Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City) specifically for races run
on the 6th day of September, 1972 but generally for
running any races in violation of the ordinance. The
notice provided for the 5 day cure period but stated
that the "termination was to be effective in the 6th day
after service of this notice since there is no way in
which the said violation can be corrected within said
period of time." (Ex P-4)
The notice of violation was based on the belief by
the Attorney General's office who were reviewing the
subject lease for renewal that Respondent had run
races exceeding the noise limits imposed by the ordinance and at the time of the notice of violation
further believed that Respondent could not run races in
compliance with the Ordinance. (Tr. 146Ln.27-147Ln.2
and Tr.60Ln. 12-18 Testimony of Frank Nelson,
Assistant Attorney General and Robert B. Hansen
Deputy Attorney General)
The history behind the actual serving of the notice
of violation by Appellant reveals that on August 16,
1972, Salt Lake City passed an ordinance which would
3
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require Respondent to comply with a decibel rating of
65 decibels in conducting its races (Tr.163 M 21). It was
stipulated in open Court (Tr. 176 Ms 5-8) that the map
introduced as Exhibit D-5 showed zones which required
a 65 decibel compliance.
In July of 1972, the Respondent made noise level
tests using an H. H. Scott Company sound level meter
(Trl57Ln. 24-30 Tr.80) approximately one block north
of the fairgrounds at 1000 West and 300 North during
actual warmups and races. (Tr.158Ln.8-10) The results
ranged from the low to mid 70's which readings were
higher than the ordinance allowed.
Based on the July tests Respondent went before
the Salt Lake City Commission and asked for variances for August 19, 26 and September 4. (Ex8-D) The
Board of City Commissioners granted variances
specifically for the days of August 19, 26, and September 4. (Ex. 9-D). The races scheduled for the 4th
were rained out and rerun on the 6th. Respondent
made no attempt to obtain a variance for the 6th.
Respondent in the Spring of 1973, appeared before
the Salt Lake City Commission to request a variance to
78 devibels based on its earlier July tests (Tr. In. 1030) The hearing was held May 10, 1973 and Respondent
represented to the Commission that "If the variance
was not granted that we would have to change our
method of racing, or racing as we had done in the past,
we would not be able to do in the future. (Tr.166 Ln. 2830).
The Commission denied Respondent's request for
a variance based on tests made by Irvine Accoustical
Engineers which showed the noise level of the race
would be 13 points higher than allowable (Tr.170 ExllD)
- - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ...' / : : - . ^ v - - : . ^ , . : - v : : ^ - .

There were newspaper reports that Respondent
4
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intended to race on the 12th of May at its regularly
scheduled race. The Appellant made the decision to
serve the notice of violation on Respondent prior to the
race on the 12th of May (Tr.151 Ln.27-30). Respondent
cancelled the race of the 12th voluntarily and has not
raced since that time at the Fairgrounds. (Tr. 230Ln. 2430) (Findings of Fact (3) R-9). A noise test was run that
same day on the 12th of May with one car and again the
noise from one car exceeded the decibel level required
by the ordinance. Ferrol Papworth told Mr. Hugh
Bringhurst, Director of Expositions that he could not
run within the decibel levels required by the Ordinance
(Tr. 133 Ln. 2-18).
Thereafter a letter was written on June 11, 1973
inviting the Respondent to return to the Fairgrounds to
race (R-9 Finding No. 4) which invitation Respondent
did not accept. No legal action was taken by
Respondent such as injunction until this present action
was filed. (Tr.231Ln.4 and 19)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AFTER FINDING THAT THE RACE CONDUCTED ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1972 WAS INVIOLATION
OF
32-9-3
REVISED
ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, THE COURT
ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT VIOLATION
WAS A LEGALLY JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS FOR
SERVING "notice of violation" ON RESPONDENT,
SALT BOWL COMPANY.
In discussion with counsel on Friday, January 11,
1974 (Tr.192 Ln.20-28) the court found that the race
conducted on September 6,1972 was in violation of the
"Noise Control" Ordinance. The court stated:
5
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"This pretrial order kind of bothered me in this thing
because with reference to that race in September,
whenever it was, I would have to find that that was a
violation of the ordinance
"

The court went on to state:
"
but at the same time I can't see that it makes any
difference. They should have had a waiver, and really its
just a days continuance, so I don't take that into consideration at all. . ."

The notice of violation served by the Appellant
dated May 11, 1973 was based on the September 6, 1972
race conducted in violation of the Noise Ordinance.
The court found that it was a violation as had the
Attorney General's office. According to Paragraph 9 of
the lease agreement such a violation is grounds for
issuing a notice of violation as per paragraph 16 of the
agreement, which Appellant did.
The court indicated that the violation was not
important because it was a technicality based on the
fact that the September 4, 1972 race which was
protected by the variance had been postponed until
September 6, 1972. This view taken by the court
overlooks the reason why all parties were concerned
about the September 6th race, i.e., because it was a
race which violated the ordinance due to the noise it
created and not because it was not covered by a
variance.
As the Attorney General's office knew that
Respondent had violated the "Noise Ordinance" by
exceeding the decibel level in an R4 Zone on September 6, 1972, when it learned that no variance had
been granted by the Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners for the 1973 season (Tr.143Ln.3-14) it used
the violation of September 6, 1972 as a basis for the
6
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"notice of violation" dated May 11, 1972. (Tr.145Ln.2729) It was a violation in the eyes of the Attorney
General's Office because the race was run at sound
levels in excess of the ordinance and not merely
because no variance was granted for the race. (Tr.153
Ln.25-28) It was reasonable to believe that without the
benefit of a variance, Respondent could not race
legally. The lease agreement states that Respondent
"Shall comply with all local laws" which the noise tests
showed they could not do. "Shall comply" implies that
without the variance it was clear the respondent
violated or would violate the ordinance.
Mr. Robert Hansen, Deputy Attorney General and
Mr. Frank Nelson, Assistant Attorney General both
testified that the "notice of violation" was served
because the Respondent had conducted races in excess
of the noise limits imposed by the ordinance and Salt
Lake City would not grant them a variance, (Tr.146
Ln.27-147 Ln.2) Mr. Ferrol Papworth, President of
Respondent company, told Mr. Hugh Bringhurst,
director of the Division of Expositions, on May 12, 1973
that he could not run a race within the ordinance
(Tr.133Ln.2-18). It was no surprise to anyone that a
"notice of violation" was served. The evidence based
on the Respondent's own study is nearly conclusive that
Respondent could not run without violating a
municipal ordinance and hence violate paragraph 9 of
the lease agreement. The "notice of violation" pursuant
to the lease agreement gave Respondent 5 days to show
whether or not they could comply with the ordinance.
Rather than conduct the race scheduled on May 12,
1972, Respondent tested the noise levels of one car on
that date and found the noise from a single car in excess
of the required level. (Tr.133Ln.9-26). Knowing that it
could not race, within the ordinance Respondent

1
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voluntarily cancelled the race scheduled that day
(Courts Findings of Fact (3) R 9). Respondent has not to
this day tried to run at the Fairgrounds.
It is submitted that all parties understood that the
"notice of violation" was for races run in excess of the
level proscribed by the ordinance and that Respondent
could not comply with the ordinance. However, the
court found the "notice of violation" was without legal
justification.
After finding the September 6, 1972 race was in
violation of the "Noise Ordinance", the court committed reversible error in holding that the "notice of
violation" was without legal justification. The court
wrongly ignored its own finding of violation of a
municipal ordinance, when the lease agreement in
paragraphs 9 and 16, specifically states that such a
violation is grounds for the issuance of said "notice of
violation". If this determination is allowed to stand then
the lease agreement and the procedure it employs for
the issuance of a "notice of violation" is emasculated.
The trial judge erred in holding that the notice of
violation was without legal justification. For a second
reason Paragraph 9 of the lease agreement stipulates
that Respondent must conduct races on the leased
premises within all national state, and local laws.
Paragraph 16 provides that when the Lessee conducts
races in violation of any of said laws that the Lessor
must serve upon Lessee a notice of violation and if the
Lessee cannot demonstrate its ability to conduct races
within local ordinances, the lease may be terminated.
The early cases hold that when subsequent
legislation makes a prior contract illegal either in its
object or in its performance then both parties are
excused from performance and breach of contract is
not available against either party. Corbin on Contracts
8
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si343. The only caveat to this general rule is that the
Lessee must have an opportunity to correct, as
provided for in the lease agreement.
But once the Lessor is made aware that the leased
premises are being used for an illegal purpose he has a
duty to inform the Lessee of the violation and require a
cessation of the illegal use. If the Lessor does not indicate his disapproval of the Lessee's illegal use of the
premise, he may be held in pari dilicto with the Lessee
and courts will not lend the Lessor aid in collecting
rent, Kessler v. Pearson 126 Ga. 725, 55 S.E.963.
Even absent a provision in the lease, a landlord
is said to have the right to void a lease when a use of the
premises by the tenant violates a zoning law. 101CJ.S.,
Zoning, S138. Furthermore, even a minor breach is
sufficient to justify a termination of a contract if the
contract is so worded. Ritter v. Perma Stone Co. 325
P.2d.442 (Okl.1958). The lease between Appellant and
Respondent provides that any violation of local, state,
or municipal ordiance or law is a sufficient ground to
terminate the lease and further that respondent "shall
comply" which submitted is a broader requirement
than a violation.
The court committed reversible error in ruling that
the notice of violation was without legal justification.
The procedure whereby the notice was served, is
outlined in the lease agreement. Respondent company
had five days in which to correct, challenge, or show
they could run races within existing local ordinances,
and said procedure is in harmony with the existing rules
governing landlord-tenant relationships.
The Appellant was put in a delicate position by the
notice of renewal of the lease at this same time (May,
1973.) Based on the information that the State had,
Respondent could not have complied with the "Noise
9
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Control" ordinance. Therefore, the State wanted to
make certain whether or not races could be conducted
legally before renewing the contract. The Appellant
was forced to either recognize the lease and run the risk
that by renewing the lease it would waive any right to
complain of breaches or to serve a notice of violation
51C. C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant SI 17 (3).
Given the two considerations: (1) renewal of the
contract may have jeopardized the Appellants opportunity to enlist the aid of the courts in collecting
rent; (Kessler v. Pearson 126Ga. 725, 55 S.E. 963) and
(2) the potential that renewal of the lease knowing of a
violation of a local ordinance may have constituted a
waiver of the right to complain of breaches 51C-C.J.S.
Landlord - Tenant SI 17 (3); the Appellant decided to
serve the notice of violation. As this procedure was
outlined in the lease agreement and in harmony with
the law governing landlord and tenant relations, the
court erred in holding the notice of violation without
legal justification.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
NOTICE OF VIOLATION SERVED MAY 12, 1973
WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF THE
LEASE.
Under the lease agreement there are two ways the
lease can be terminated. Paragraph 13 provides for an
automatic termination:
"It is expressly understood and agreed that in the event
Lessee's activities upon the leased premises are determined by any Court having jurisdiction to be unlawful or
to constitute a public nuisance, whether in litigation
commenced by anyone. Then and in such event, this lease

10 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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agreement shall be terminated forthwith, and the
obligations of both parties hereunder shall be immediately
avoided and suspended."

While paragraphs 9 and 16 provide for termination
by filing a notice of violation and Lessee's failure to
cure:
"Lessee shall conduct activities on the above described
premises in a lawful manner. Lessee will not suffer or
permit any illegal business or transaction of which it has
knowledge to take place upon or near said premises.
Lessee shall comply with all Federal, State and Local Laws
in connection with its operations upon said premise."
Paragraph 16
"The Lessor may terminate this Lease Agreement at any
time if the Lessee violates any of the terms and conditions
herein contained, provided, however, said termination
may not be effected until and unless Lessor has given
Lessee written notice of each violation and the same
remains uncorrected for a period of (5) five days after
receipt of said notice."

Both methods of termination of the contract are
valid, however, the method used by the Respondent
was the method relying on paragraphs 9 and 16. The
notice of violation specifically stated it was served
pursuant to paragraph 9 of the lease. That this method
is recognized as valid by the Utah Supreme Court is
shown in the case of Gerard v. Young 20U.2d.30, 432
P.2d.343 (1967). In Gerard the Lessor was entitled to
terminate the lease where the leased premises were
being used in violation of State law and the violation
continued.
On the 16th day of August, 1972 an ordinance was
passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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City, Utah by adding Chapter 9, entitled "Noise
Control" to Title 32 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake City, Utah. Respondent was aware of this ordinance and through its attorney, Mr. Lee Hobbs,
wrote to the Salt Lake City Commission to acquire an
exemption from the ordinance on August 14, 1972. The
request reads as follows:
"With reference to the 'Noise Abatement' ordinance
which your Honorable Body is presently considering, my
client, The Fairgrounds Speedway Company, has
presently scheduled automobile racing at the State Fair
Grounds in Salt Lake City for August 19, 26 and September 4. They have also scheduled the Tournament of
Thrills' for August 21 and 22."
"My client presently holds a license issued by Salt Lake
City to carry on these shows, which are scheduled between 5:00 o'clock and 10:30 o'clock P.M. on the dates
noted."
"We respectfully request that these scheduled activities be
exempted from the proposed ordinance, upon its passage,
pursuant to Section 32-8-9 (e) of the ordinance, and we
hereby request permission to continue with these shows
on the dates indicated pursuant to 32-8-11 (b) and (c).

The City Commission granted the exemption to
terminate September 4, 1972, at 10:00 o'clock P.M.
They granted the exemption because Respondent had
scheduled their races prior to the passing of the ordinance:
"The Board of City Commissioners, at its meeting today,
considered your request referred to as Petition No. 491 of
1972, that the automobile races which you have scheduled
at the State Fairgrounds for August 19 and 26-September
4, 1972, and also the Tournament of Thrills' for August 21
and 22, 1972 between 5:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. on said

12
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dates, be exempted from the proposed 'Noise Abatement'
ordinance, upon its passage, pursuant to Section 32-8-9 (e)
of the ordinance, and for permission to continue with
these shows on the dates indicated pursuant to Section 328-11 (b) and (c)."
"Inasmuch as these commitments were made prior to the
adoption of the noise ordinances, the City Commission
granted your request, subject to the provision that these
activities will conclude at 10:30p.m. on the dates
requested. Thereafter, full compliance with the noise
ordinance will be necessary. (Emphasis added)"

On the 6th day of September, 1972, after the
exemption had expired, the Respondent conducted
races which violated the "Noise Control" ordinance.
This race was the last race of the 1972 season, but on
April 9, 1973, the Respondent requested a special
permit from the Salt Lake City Commission to conduct
races during the 1973 season which would violate the
"Noise Control" ordinance. A hearing was held May 10,
1973, pursuant to that request, to consider the merits of
the request. At the hearing the Respondent, through its
president, Ferrol Papworth, represented that it would
be impossible for them to conduct legal races unless
their request was granted. The Board of City Commissioners denied the request.
As the Respondent had conducted races on
September 6, 1972 which were in violation of the
"Noise Control" ordinance, and as it was not given an
exemption by the Salt Lake City Commission for the
1973, the Attorney General's Office, acting for the
Division of Exposition of the State of Utah, filed a
notice of violation with the Respondent on May 12,
1973.
This notice of violation was authorized by
paragraphs 9 and 16 of the Lease Agreement,
13
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Respondent had in fact violated a local law (paragraph
9) which gave the Appellant the right to file a notice of
violation pursuant to paragraph 16 of the lease
agreement. Further it was reasonable to believe that
Respondent could not comply with the ordinance
provision unless changes were made.
This notice of violation gave the Respondent five
days to cure, it was presented on the day of a race and if
Respondent had been able to race that day within the
allowed decibel limits of the "Noise Control" ordinance, the termination mentioned in paragraph 16
would not have become effective.
The actions of the Appellant were in concert with
the provisions of the lease agreement. The procedure
required by the lease agreement when the premises
were used in violation of State law was followed.
Consequently the trial judge committed reversible
error in holding that the notice of violation was in
violation of the lease.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENT BASED ON
ACTIONS OF THE APPELLANT WHICH WERE IN
HARMONY WITH THE LEASE AGREEMENT AND
NON-ACTION ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT
WHO FAILED TO EITHER CURE OR CHALLENGE
THE NOTICE OF VIOLATION.
The lease agreement itself sets up the method by
which Respondent-Lessee is to be notified by Appellant-Lessor that Lessor has reason to believe Lessee
is violating a local ordinance or cannot comply with the
local ordinance. The Court failed to take intn
^e
^ «^uiifl,
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that

Appellant had a reasonable basis for believing
Respondent had, was or would violate the Salt Lake
City Ordinance. The Statement of Facts shows that
tests were run and Respondent knew that racing at the
Fairgrounds would violate the noise levels imposed by
the ordinance. Appellant knew of the action of Salt
Lake City in denying the variance and was in fact in
close contact with the City Attorney. That denial by the
city was based on test results of Irvine Accoustical
Engineers. Appellant knew that the lease was up for
renewal and knew that Appellant was to race on the
12th. Based on information and belief the notice of
violation was served pursuant to paragraph 9.
It is important to note that after the Appellant
served its notice based upon what information it had
the Respondent did absolutely nothing. Respondent did
not run its race on the 12th as scheduled but cancelled
it. It did not seek injunctive relief or try to respond to
or challenge the notice of violation in any way. It
served no letters on the Appellant saying a mistake had
been made. Instead it did nothing to mitigate the effect
of the notice of violation other than file a law suit for
damages.
It is submitted that Respondent's had some affirmative duty to attempt to cure the notice of violation
or in some way respond to the notice or challenge the
notice in some way other than doing nothing about the
notice. Respondent should not be awarded damages
when Appellant sends a notice pursuant to a contract
provision and Respondent does nothing about the
situation.
The lease contemplates a possible termination of
the lease in the event that the Respondent does not
comply with all provisions of local state and federal
law. (see paragraphs 9 and 16). A method was also
15
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prescribed for the Appellant to proceed with steps to
eventually terminate the lease if such a noncompliance, either actual or anticipatory, did occur.
h (Paragraph 16 of Lease Agreement.)
In order to effect any termination for noncompliance, either actual or anticipatory, the Appellant must comply with the method prescribed by the
parties in the contract. There can be no termination
unless the notice of termination complies with all
requirements relating thereto. Texas and N.O.R. Co., v.
Phillips, 196 F.2d 692 (1952). Where a contract is
specifically mentioned in a notice given under it, the
terms of the contract are controlling. Furthermore a
notice given under a contract providing for such notice
must be construed according to the intention of the
parties to the contract. Therefore, in construing the
notice of violation, (which is not a notice of termination) the terms of the contract for which such
notice is given should be used in interpreting the
notice. The lease agreement requires five days after a
notice of violation is served for the Respondent to
correct any violation. The parties to the lease
agreement must have intended this five day leeway to
allow the Respondent time to correct or cure violations
or challenge the notice in order to prevent a forfeiture
or a termination of the lease. Therefore, the Appellant
in its notice of violation served notice that the
Respondent had five days to correct its deficiency
consist with the lease agreement. This would require
some showing that Respondent could comply with the
Salt Lake City noise ordinance or in some way change
their requirements. If the Respondent corrected the
I' violation in that five day period no termination could
occur. As noted in 51 C-C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant,
SI 14 (3) , a notice of termination must give Lessee the
16
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time specified in the lease, prior to the time when
forfeiture is declared. The Lessee is entitled to the time
specified in the notice in which to cure the default,
prior to the taking effect of the forfeiture. The notice of
violation should not be construed otherwise since it is
impossible for any one party to alter the terms of the
lease agreement without the consent of the other party
to the contract. In other words, it would have been
impossible for the State of Utah to shorten the five day
period as required by the lease agreement, or enforce a
forfeiture if a cure was made.
The effect of a period for a tenant to cure a defect
or a violation is found in the case of Caranas v. Morgan
Hosts, 460 S.W. 2d 225 (1970). In that case the lease
required the use of a particular kind of cash register on
the premises by the Lessee. However, the Lessee failed
to use such a cash register and the Landlord served a
written notice to cure the defect within thirty days
according to the lease, or he subject to termination
without notice. The Court held that where the Appellant had failed to cure the defect that the breach was
sufficient to justify a termination of the lease. Thus,
where terms allow for a correction of a defect the
tenant has the duty to cure the defect or to suffer a
termination thereafter.
In the case of Collins v. Isaacson, 261 Iowa 236,
158 N.W.2d 14 (1968), the tenant did correct the
violation within the time allowed and was therefore not
required to suffer a termination of his lease. With
respect to the thirty day period for correction the court
said the following:
Further, the lease prepared by Plaintiff, provides, as
quoted supra, that a forfeiture could be declared if
defendant failed to make the payment contemplated
therein or to perform any of its covenants, by serving a
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thirty day notice of forfeiture, provided defendant 'shall
fail to pay said sum or sums, or perform said conditions in
default within said thirty day period. . . .' It stands
admitted that within the thirty day period defendant made
a good and sufficient tender to Plaintiff of all sums due
him under the lease-option agreement in the event the
option were exercised. Plaintiff's right to declare a forfeiture of the agreement did not mature.

Additional support for the conclusion, that a
tenant has an affirmative duty to correct defects during
a period allowed therefore, is found in 17 Am.Jur. 2d
Contracts S356.
In some cases, a
purpose of such a
party allegedly in
default and meet

notice of default is required and the
notice in the usual case, is to give the
default an opportunity to remedy the
his obligations.

From the preceeding authority it is clear that a
tenant is allowed the period noted in a lease agreement
to correct any violation noted by the landlord. If he
corrects the violation within that time the landlord's
right to a forfeiture does not mature and no forfeiture
can take place. However, if he fails to correct the
violation in that time then the right to declare a forfeiture does mature and unless the landlord otherwise
waives the right to a forfeiture the lease will terminate.
The Appellant served a notice of violation upon
the Respondent on May 12, allowing the five day period
for correction of the violation. Had the Respondent
corrected the violation or made any attempt to indicate
the violation did not exist or would be corrected, a right
to declare a termination would not have matured in
favor of the Appellant. It was the duty of the
Respondent to correct the violation or else suffer the
results of a termination. However, there is no evidence
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that the Respondent attempted any such correction in
order to continue its lease. In fact the testimony is that
Respondent chose not to run the race or cure the
allegations set forth in the notice of violation. In the
Caranas case, supra, when the Lessee failed to correct
the violation the lease was held to be terminated by the
court. The Respondent should not be allowed now to
come forward and request damages after it has already
failed in its duty to correct the violations noted in the
notice of violation. Had the Respondent made an attempt to correct the violations as in the Collins case,
supra, and succeeded in correcting the violation as it
did in that case, there would have been no reason for a
termination and they would have continued racing for
the 1973 season without any problem.
It should be noted that the notice served on May
12 was only a notice of violation, and not a notice of
termination. All the notice of violation attempted to do
was to require the plaintiff to correct that violation if
possible. Since that notice of violation served on the
Respondent the Appellant has constantly reminded the
Salt Bowl Company that they could conduct races on
the State Fairgrounds if they would comply with the
Salt Lake City Noise Ordinance. This, in effect, has
extended the five day period to allow them to show a
correction of any violation. However, the Respondent
has failed to meet this duty to show a correction in
order to justify any extension of the lease. Therefore,
the Respondent should not be allowed to come forward
requesting damages after numerous opportunities to
show their lease should be continued.
The court erred in finding a wrongful termination
of the lease based on the notice of violation being in
violation of the terms of the lease. The notice by the
terms of the lease calls for termination if the violation is
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not challenged. The duty to stop the termination is on
the Respondent which duty Appellant submits
Respondent did not discharge in any way or even attempt to discharge in any way.

SUMMARY and CONCLUSION
It was error for the Court to find that Appellant
wrongfully terminated the lease. In order to so find the
Court committed error by finding the notice of
violation was not legally justified when the terms of the
lease (Paragraphs 9, 16) specifically outline the
procedure by which a notice of violation is to be served
and on what basis. The notice of violation itself
specifically states it was served pursuant to paragraph 9
of the Lease. The Court found that the race on the 6th
(which is the day mentioned in the notice of violation)
was in violation of the ordinance which simply means
that the Court found sufficient evidence to conclude
that races run on a regular basis without some
modification for noise were run at noise levels in excess
of the ordinance requirements. This means that the
races were run in excess of the noise levels and it is
reasonable to believe that any other races would also
be in excess of the noise levels required by the ordinance. The testimony from the Attorney General's
office was that it was concern for the noise levels and
the fact that no variance was granted by the City which
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prompted its service of the notice of violation. The
notice of violation doesn't terminate the lease unless
the Respondent fails to do some affirmative act to cure,
challenge or comply. The testimony is that Respondent
did nothing and in fact cancelled its race on the 12th
which could have shown compliance if the noise levels
had been below those required by the ordinance. It was
the act of the Respondent in doing nothing that caused
the termination not the notice of violation served by
Appellant.
It was error for the court to award damages as the
contract was not wrongfully terminated but required
the non-action of the Respondent to effect the termination. The Respondent did not attempt in any way
to mitigate its damages, challenge the notice or resist
the effect of the notice of violation.
It is submitted that it was clearly error for the
Court to find for Respondent in this matter when there
was a basis for a notice of violation and the Contract
procedures were followed. The Respondent clearly did
nothing to resist the effect of the notice of violation and
as the Court concluded was running races at noise
levels above those set forth in the ordinance. The race
on the 6th was in fact a violation and without a variance
any other race would be a violation. The Respondent
failed to obtain a variance and the notice was served. If
the notice had not been served the Appellant is then in
the position of reasonably knowing of illegal and
unlawful practices on the premises and doing nothing
about it. As a public body the Appellant felt it had a
duty to serve the notice of violation as Respondent
could always race if it were in compliance. However,
Respondent never took the opportunity to show it
could and its past history would reasonably lead one to
believe it could not comply.
is
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To rule for Respondent as the court did is
reversible error and Appellant prays for a reversal of
that ruling as a matter of law.
Respectfully submitted,

DON R. STRONG
Special Assistant Attorney General
197 South Main Street
Springville, Utah
Attorney for PlaintiffsRespondents
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